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Abstract: Although several major immunologic hurdles need to be
overcome, the pig is currently considered the most likely source animal of
cells, tissues and organs for transplantation into humans. Concerns have
been raised with regard to the potential for the transfer of infectious
agents with the transplanted organ to the human recipient. This risk is
perceived to be increased as it is likely that the patient will be
iatrogenically immunocompromised and the organ-source pig may be
genetically engineered in such a way to render its organs particularly
susceptible to infection with human viruses. Furthermore, the risk may
not be restricted to the recipient, but may have consequences for the
health of others in the community. The identification of porcine
endogenous retroviruses and of hitherto unknown viruses have given rise
to the most concern. We document here the agents we believe should be
excluded from the organ-source pigs. We discuss the likelihood of
achieving this aim and outline the potential means by which it may best
be achieved.
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Introduction
The great limitation in the number of human
donor organs available for transplantation has
led to a renewed interest in overcoming the
immunological problems related to xenotrans-
plantation [1]. For a number of reasons, including
microbiologic safety, non-human primates are no
longer considered to be the preferred animal
organ source despite their immunologic closeness
to humans [2–5]. Most effort is being directed to
the use of the pig, for reasons that have been
elucidated and discussed elsewhere [6,7].
Although several major immunologic hurdles
need to be overcome, the pig has many logistic
advantages, one of which is its suitability for
genetic manipulation, which can, for example,
provide its organs with some protection against
human complement [8]. The risk regarding the
potential for the transfer of infectious agents to
the human recipient with the transplanted tissues
or organ is considered less if the pig (rather than a
non-human primate) is the source (donor)
animal. The very few studies carried out to try
to assess this risk have been largely limited to an
assessment of non-viral agents, and have demon-
strated that swine [commercial specified pathogen
free (SPF)] are largely free of bacteria, fungi and
parasites that might be pathogenic in humans [9].
Nevertheless, some concern remains [10–12].
With human organ donors, present technology
is able to identify most serious pathogens, such as
toxoplasma, hepatitis viruses, and human
immunodeficiency viruses, but the presence of
one or more of these agents is sometimes accepted
when the patient’s condition is critical. Other
organisms, which are likely to cause disease that
may be considered less serious, such as cytome-
galovirus and Epstein–Barr virus, are commonly
knowingly transferred from donor to host; to
exclude them would entail excluding an unac-
ceptably high number of potential donors.
Although there will be much greater control
over the microbiologic status of specially bred
and housed swine, there remains an unknown risk
of the transfer of a porcine infectious agent that is
not seen in humans. This risk may not be
restricted to the recipient, but may have con-
sequences for public health. For example, as pig
endogenous retroviruses (PoERVs) are present in
the pig cell genome [10–15], their transfer with the
transplant would be inevitable. This does not
necessarily imply, however, that PoERVs would
be expressed, propagated, transmitted and
become pathogenic in humans.
Table 1. Bacteria, fungi and parasites to be excluded
from the organ source herd
Bacteria
Actinobacillus equuli
Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae
Actinobacillus suis
Actinomyces (Eubacterium) suis
Arcobacter spp.
Bacillus anthracis
Bordetella bronchiseptica
Brucella suis
Campylobacter spp.
Chlamydia spp.
Clostridium spp.
Coxiella burnetti
Eperythrozoon suis
Erysipelothrix spp.
Escherichia coli (verotoxigenic)
Hemophilus parasuis
Lawsonia intracellularis
Leptospira spp.
Listeria spp.
Multiresistant organisms:
Vancomycin-resistant enterococci
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
Vancomycin intermediate-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
Mycobacterium spp.
Mycoplasma spp.
Pasteurella spp.
Pseudomonas pseudomallei
Rhodococcus equi
Salmonella spp.
Serpulina hyodysenteriae
Serpulina pilosicoli
Staphylococcus hyicus
Streptococcus suis
Streptococcus spp. (only exclude types known to be pig pathogens or which
result in clinical disease in the donor cohort)
Yersinia spp.
Fungi
Systemic mycoses:
Absence of systemic mycosis will be confirmed at sentinel and donor necropsy.
Dermatophytes:
Microsporum spp.
Trichophyton spp.
Parasites
Protozoa
Babesia spp.
Balantidium coli
Cryptosporidium spp.
Eimeria spp.
Entameba suis
Giardia spp.
Isospora spp.
Neospora spp.
Sarcocystis miescheriana
Sarcocystis suihominis
Toxoplasma gondii
Trypanosoma spp. (in geographically relevant areas)
Helminths
Ascaris suum
Echinococcus granulosus
Esophagostomum spp.
Hyostrongylus rubidus
Macrocanthorhynchus hirudinaceous
Metastrongylus spp.
Stephanura dentatus
Strongyloides spp.
Taenia solium
Toxocara spp.
Trichinella spiralis
Trichostrongylus spp.
Trichuris suis
Arthropods
All arthropods to be excluded
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With implantation of a pig organ into a human
patient, many barriers to infection are bypassed.
If an infection with a pig agent were established in
a patient, further adaptation to the host may
follow. Several recent examples of interspecies
transmission of viruses accompanied by adapta-
tion to a new host have been reported [16,17]. The
immunosuppression required to prevent xeno-
graft rejection further reduces the host’s resis-
tance to infection.
For example, human antibodies directed
against Gala1–3Gal (Gal) epitopes on the pig
organ are the prime initiators of antibody-
mediated rejection of transplanted pig organs
[18,19]. Several bacteria, viruses and protozoa
express Gal on their cell sufaces, and anti-Gal
antibodies may form part of the body’s immune
defence mechanism against them [19,20]. Weiss
[21] has emphasized that lysis of certain non-
human retroviruses is triggered in humans by the
binding of anti-Gal antibodies to Gal residues
expressed on the viral envelope [22–24]. Many
current strategies for xenotransplantation involve
depletion of anti-Gal antibodies and/or suppres-
sion of Gal-reactive B cells. Such modifications
may remove a barrier to infection with both
PoERVs and other infectious agents.
A second strategy for xenotransplantation is to
develop pigs transgenic for human complement
regulatory proteins, such as decay-accelerating
factor (CD55), membrane cofactor protein
(CD46), and CD59. This may provide opportu-
nities for human viruses to infect the porcine
organ. It has been shown, for instance, that two
of these human complement regulatory proteins
are receptors for human viral pathogens [21].
CD46 can function as a cell surface coreceptor for
the measles virus [25] and CD55 can serve as a
binding receptor for Echo and Coxsackie B
viruses [26,27]. A theoretical possibility is that
human viruses might adapt to replication in
transgenic pig tissue. Consequently, transgenic
pigs may become susceptible to human and other
viruses to which they were not susceptible
previously. Subsequent transmission to domestic
and wild pigs could have adverse economic and
environmental consequences. Consideration of
this issue is, however, beyond the remit of this
paper.
Two aspects of the potential for the transfer of
infectious agents have given rise to most concern.
First, the introduction of PoERVs, which, if they
are found to infect human cells in vivo, might lead
to malignant, immunosuppressive or other dis-
ease in the transplant recipient. Secondly, the
transfer of a PoERV or a hitherto unknown agent
might lead to spreading beyond the transplant
recipient into the human population. A compli-
cating factor is the possibility of a long latent and
adaptation period, extending over decades,
between the introduction of a new agent and
the development of pathology related to its
presence.
The risk of transferring an unknown agent will,
by definition, never be totally avoided, but every
effort must be made to ensure that no known
agent of pathogenic potential is transferred to the
human recipient. A less-than-ideal microbiologic
status of a brain-dead human organ donor is
frequently acceptable in view of the desperate
need for the organ. This standard will not be
acceptable as a reference against which pig organs
can be compared. The pig organ will be
considered a ‘‘biological product’’, which must
be held up to exacting standards. A definition of
these standards forms the subject of this paper,
which is put forward as a basis for discussion.
The authors of this paper are independent
members of an advisory board (set up by
Novartis Pharma AG) charged with advising on
the microbiologic safety criteria to be met before
clinical trials of pig organ xenotransplantation.
To this end, we have assessed the topic in detail
and have developed standards to minimize risk.
Our mandate related specifically to xenotrans-
plantation of the kidney and heart and the use of
the liver for ex vivo perfusion. We have
documented the agents we believe should be
excluded from the organ-source pigs and from the
donor organs. We have considered the likelihood
of achieving this aim and the means by which it
can be achieved.
Breeding and maintenance of the donor pig cohorts
All pigs that are destined for use as sources of
organs for xenotransplantation will need to be of
exceptionally high health status. It is not
recommended that attempts should be made to
raise pigs as gnotobiotes until they have grown
large enough for organ excision. This would be
impractical (because of the limited size of the
isolators and the large volume of material that
would need to be passed through them), counter-
productive (as gnotobiotic pigs lack the gastro-
intestinal flora required for normal development),
and not in the best interests of the welfare of the
animals. There are also benefits in characterizing
source animals when they are raised in stable
cohorts, which would not be possible if they were
maintained separately in isolators. For example,
extensive testing of representative sentinal ani-
mals from such a cohort may provide an
Control of disease transmission
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indication of the microbiologic status of the
entire group.
A founder line of SPF (transgenic or non-
transgenic) pigs will be used to derive a breeding
herd. Pigs destined for this herd will be obtained
by gnotobiotic surgical techniques (e.g. hyster-
otomy or hysterectomy) from pregnant SPF
foundation sows to establish a breeding herd of
qualified health status. On practical and welfare
grounds, our recommendation is that these pigs
should be maintained under such conditions for
only two to three weeks, which will ensure that
the vulnerable neonates are maintained in clean
conditions during the first few days of life. They
will then be transferred into a separate barrier
facility, with barrier air filters and strict biose-
curity. Because the breeding herd is intended to
be maintained over a period of years with
recurrent introductions of new stock, it may
not be possible to maintain it as free from
infectious agents as will be required for the
subsequent source pig cohorts (i.e. the offspring
of the breeding herd).
The actual organ-source pigs may be derived in
one of two ways. One is by hysterotomy, followed
by an initial period in isolators under gnotobiotic
conditions (as described above for the derivation
of the breeder herd). However, this method
generally involves euthanasia of the sow and is
thus costly and can be criticized in terms of
unnecessary termination of life of the sow. The
alternative would be for the source pigs to be
naturally farrowed and, after five days, undergo
segregated early weaning (Isowean) [28,29],
which is known to minimize the transmission of
undesirable microorganisms from the flora of the
breeding herd. This method is probably prefer-
able when large numbers of pigs are being bred
(and will be considered the method of choice for
the purposes of this paper). Whichever method is
chosen for delivery and initial care, each cohort
of pigs (perhaps 10 to 20 in number) will
subsequently be reared in strict isolation in
separate barriers away from the breeding herd.
Such barrier techniques are well-established in
the rearing of high-health and immunocompro-
mised laboratory animals. Approximately one
month before the excision of the organs to be
transplanted, the cohort will be moved to a
separate quarantine barrier room.
The breeding herd and the cohorts of source
pigs will be housed in a building or barrier with
tight biosecurity ensuring that no contact occurs
with other animal species, including rodents,
birds and arthropods. No direct contact will be
allowed between one cohort and any other
cohort. Positive (above atmospheric) air pressure
gradients of high-efficiency particulate (HEPA)
filtered air should exclude most airborne infec-
tious agents from the animal rooms. All feed and
water supplied will be sterilized. The diet will be
vegetarian, with no animal proteins or any bovine
products, except milk-derived lactose. Antibiotics
will be excluded from the pig feed to reduce the
risk of selection for antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
All persons who come into contact with the
breeding herd or the organ-source pigs will be
required to shower and change into sterilized
clothing on entering the facility and when moving
from one cohort to another. The wearing of body
exhaust suits to allow filtration of expired air and
exclusion of shed skin scales is currently not
considered to be necessary. We recommend that
screening of animal caretakers should include
specific assays for viral hepatitis, including
hepatitis E, and broad screening of liver function,
which might indicate a low-grade viral infection.
Vaccination for hepatitis B would be appropiate,
but vaccination for some viral infections, such as
influenza, might be contraindicated as they may
mask viral shedding. Decisions on such questions
would be made on a case-by-case basis. All
animal caretakers who may have any potentially
infectious ailment will be excluded from the
facility, again on a case-by-case basis. They will
also be temporarily excluded if they have been in
close contact with wild or domestic animals
outside of the workplace.
We recommend, as a general policy, that
vaccination of the pigs against bacteria and
viruses should be avoided as it may be unreliable,
may mask clinical signs of infection, and may
impair the ability to diagnose infection by
monitoring the antibody response.
In the time required to rear a newborn pig
(under the conditions of barrier isolation outlined
above) to the size necessary for its organs to be
suitable for transplantation into an adult human
(which will be several months), some organisms
listed in . Tables 1 and 2 (below) may become
established in the pigs. However, the presence of
many of these agents in the digestive or
respiratory tracts is unlikely to present a problem
for the use of the kidneys or heart for xeno-
transplantation as long as these specific organs
remain free of these agents.
Infectious agents to be excluded from the organ-
source cohort pigs
The infectious agents that are considered unac-
ceptable in source animals are largely those that
(i) carry a risk to the pigs, (ii) are of zoonotic or
Onions et al.
146
potential xenozoonotic risk if transferred to an
immunosuppressed human recipient of a pig
organ, or (iii) indicate a breach in biosecurity.
Detection of any of these agents would require
immediate action and full investigation of
animals, facilities and personnel.
Bacteria, fungi and parasites (Table 1)
It is known from experience with human
allotransplantation that bacteria, fungi and
parasites can cause serious infection in the graft
and recipient [30–33]. With this in mind, the
organisms known to infect pigs have been
considered. Many of these were previously
identified by Fishman [34]. It would be mislead-
ing to consider only those microorganisms known
to be zoonotic. A wide variety of organisms,
including environmental organisms, plant patho-
gens, and saprophytic fungi, can infect the
immunocompromised human. Table 1 lists the
bacteria, fungi and parasites that we believe
should not be present in organ-source pigs. There
are organisms listed here (and new ones being
described) whose epidemiology is still only
partially understood. The list of organisms to
be excluded therefore requires regular review.
The risks of bacteria in xenotransplantation
differ from those of viruses in that bacterial
infections pose less risk to the population at large
and are generally amenable to therapy. Never-
theless, all pathogenic bacteria that cause systemic
disease in pigs or affect any of the organs to be
used for transplantation should be excluded. The
multidrug resistant bacteria [methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-
intermediate-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(VISA) and vancomycin-resistant enterococcus
(VRE)] should be excluded from the pig in line
with most recommendations for standards for
human donation.
Fungi are usually acquired from the external
environment and are not thought to pose a
particular risk associated with the pig organ
unless the pig has a systemic mycosis. Parasites
limited to the gastrointestinal tract are unlikely to
pose a risk, but may indicate a break in
biosecurity. Some porcine parasites, however,
such as Toxoplasma gondii, could be transferred
in the pig organ or tissue and must therefore be
excluded from the organ-source cohort. Our
recommendation is that all parasites should be
screened for and excluded, while further evidence
is accrued.
Routine monitoring will be necessary at
intervals throughout the life of the source pig.
We would recommend that it consist of physical
examination and serologic testing of all piglets in
the cohort soon after segregated early weaning
and transfer to the rearing barrier. Serologic
testing would be repeated at two months and
again on transfer to the final quarantine barrier,
approximately one month before organ excision.
Bacteriologic screening of nasal and fecal swabs
should be carried out in all cohort members every
month and of tonsillar swabs at two months of
age. A monthly check for parasites should be
made on a pooled fecal sample. If clinically
indicated, cultures of blood, nose, throat, urine
and feces should be carried out in individual
animals at any time. At two months and prior to
approval of a cohort for human clinical use of the
organs, sentinel animals will be selected. Samples
for extensive bacterial and parasite serology and
antigen-detection tests will be collected and full
necropsies performed.
As a precaution in case the pig is in an
asymptomatic bacteremic phase of an infection,
blood will be drawn for culture at the time of
organ excision. If a positive blood culture is
obtained, then, as when such organisms are
identified in a cadaveric human allograft donor,
the recipients of the organs can receive the
relevant anti-microbial therapy.
Should a potential pathogen be detected in one
or more members of the cohort (e.g. a sentinel
animal), a number of possible actions would need
to be considered, the appropriate choice made,
and action taken. This action might include
culling (i) all the pigs in the building, (ii) the pigs
in the specific contaminated barrier or pen, (iii)
individual pigs, or (iv) initiating treatment of one
or more pigs to eliminate the infection. Treatment
should be restricted to short courses with narrow-
spectrum anti-microbials. In all cases, organ
procurement should be discontinued until mon-
itoring confirms that the cohort or herd is
infection-free.
Viruses (Table 2)
Viruses pose a particular hazard in that, although
they are often species-specific, cross-species
transmissions have been recorded and these can
be devastating in an immunologically naive host
population. Furthermore, most, if not all, recent
examples of newly emerging viral diseases in
humans, such as AIDS [17], pandemic influenza
[35], hanta- [36] and Nipah [37–38] virus disease,
have been elicited by cross-species transmission
of their causative agents. In particular, there are
examples of RNA viruses, which have a high rate
of mutation [35], and of the simpler DNA viruses,
like parvoviruses [39], becoming established in
Control of disease transmission
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Table 2. Viruses to be excluded from the donor cohort
Family/genus Species Exclude from herd/cohort Category
Picornaviridae
Aphthovirus Foot and mouth disease Yes 2,5
Enterovirus Enterovirus 1 Yes 5
Talfan/Teschen
Enterovirus (other serogroups) Yes 5
Swine vesicular disease Yes 1
Human enteroviruses Yes
Cardiovirus Encephalomyocarditis Yes 1
Hepatovirus N/A *
Rhinovirus Human serotypes Desirable but may not be possible 5
Caliciviridae
Vesicular exanthema N/A (extinct in pigs) 5
Enteric calicivirus Yes (possibly same virus as swine hepatitis E virus) 1
Swine hepatitis E Yes 1
Astroviridae
Porcine astrovirus Desirable but not essential 5
Togaviridae
Alphavirus Western encephalitis Yes 1
Eastern encephalitis Yes 1
Venezuelan encephalitis Yes 1
Getah Yes 1
Chikungunya Yes 1
Rubivirus N/A *
Flaviviridae
Flavivirus Japanese B encephalitis Yes 1
Louping Ill/TBE complex Yes 1
Wesselsbron disease Yes 1
Apoi Yes 2
Dengue fever Yes 1
West Nile fever Yes 1
Pestivirus Classical swine fever (hog cholera) Yes 5
Bovine viral diarrhoea Yes 5
Border disease Yes 5
Coronaviridae
Coronavirus Transmissible gastroenteritis Yes 4, 5
Porcine respiratory coronavirus Yes 4, 5
Epidemic diarrhea Yes 4, 5
Haemagglutinating encephalomyelitis Yes 4, 5
Arterivirus Porcine reproductive & respiratory disease syndrome Yes 4, 5
Torovirus Porcine torovirus Desirable but not essential 5
Paramyxoviridae
Respirovirus Parainfluenza type 1 (Sendai) Yes 2
Parainfluenza 2 Yes 2*
Parainfluenza 3 Yes 2
Morbillivirus Not recorded in pigs but the CD46 transgene may act as *
coreceptor for the measles virus
Rubulavirus Porcine rubulavirus (La Pied ad Michoacan) Yes 5
Pneumovirus Respiratory syncytial Yes 2
Undesignated genus Menangle Yes 1
Undesignated genus Nipah Yes 1
Rhabdoviridae
Vesiculovirus Vesicular stomatitis Yes 1
Lyssavirus Rabies Yes 1
Ephemerovirus N/A *
Filoviridae
Filovirus N/A *
Bornaviridae
Bornavirus Bornavirus Yes 2, 5
Orthomyxoviridae
Influenza A Yes 1
Influenza B Yes 5
Influenza C Yes 5
Bunyaviridae
Bunyavirus Cache valley Yes 1, 5
Akabane Yes 5
Batai Yes 1, 5
Hantavirus Hantavirus Yes 1, 5
Nairovirus N/A
Phlebovirus N/A
Arenaviridae
Lymphocytic choriomeningitis Yes 1, 5
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new hosts. In addition, few viruses are amenable
to therapy so that any successful transfer of
infection from source animal to human would be
difficult to treat.
In addition to the swine-specific viruses, many
other viruses must be rigorously excluded. Table 2
lists all of the viruses recommended for exclusion
from the organ-source pigs, and are categorized on
the basis of (i) being of known zoonotic potential,
(ii) having the ability to replicate in human cells or
having some evidence for zoonotic potential, (iii)
having poor replication efficiency in humans but
nevertheless with the potential to be oncogenic, (iv)
if not currently defined as zoonotic, to be of wide
host range, and (v) being detrimental to the health
of the herd or indicating a breakdown in
biosecurity. Consequently, source pigs would
need to be meticulously screened for viruses in
these categories. Where screening tests are not
currently available, these will need to be developed.
Introduction of any one of these viruses into the
herd would be an indication of a breach in
biosecurity and mandate closer examination or
re-examination of all husbandry practices. Sound
husbandry practices, with barrier rearing, should
ensure that most viruses are excluded from the
herd.
Exclusion may in some instances be based on
geographic isolation, but in many instances
diagnostic assays will be required. For instance,
vesicular stomatitis does not occur in Europe but
serological testing for this virus and the equine
encephalitis viruses would be required in the
USA where they are endemic or epizootic. In
Australasia, antibody tests will need to include
those for Apoi, Ibaraki, Japanese B encephalitis,
and Menangle viruses. The frequency of sampling
and the type of test will depend on the virus in
question. The intensity of testing may change
depending on circumstances, such as an outbreak
of viral disease in the local area.
Daily clinical examination and periodic testing
for viral infection (after segregated early weaning,
at two months, and when the cohort enters the
Reoviridae
Orbivirus Ibaraki Yes 5
Coltivirus N/A 5*
Reovirus Reovirus 1–3 Yes 2
Rotavirus Rotavirus A, B, C, E. Yes 2
Birnaviridae
Porcine picobirnavirus Desirable but not essential 5
Retroviridae
Gammaretrovirus Porcine endogenous See text 2
Hepadnaviridae
Hepadnavirus Hepatitis B N/A *
Circoviridae
Circovirus Porcine circovirus Yes (but may be difficult as may cross placenta) 5
Parvoviridae
Parvovirus Porcine parvovirus Yes 4, 5
Papovaviridae
Polyomavirus Porcine polyomavirus Yes 3
Papillomavirus Porcine genital papillomavirus Yes 3, 5
Adenoviridae
Porcine adenovirus serotypes 1–4 Yes 3
Herpesviridae
Alphaherpesvirinae Pseudorabies Yes 2
Betaherpesvirinae Porcine cytomegalovirus Yes (but may be difficult as crosses placenta and becomes latent) 5
Gammaherpesvirinae Porcine lymphotropic herpesvirus type 1 Yes (but may be difficult) 3
Porcine lymphotropic herpesvirus type 2 Yes (but may be difficult) 3
Poxviridae
Suipoxvirus Swinepox Yes 5
Orthopoxvirus Vaccinia N/A 2
Cowpox Yes 1, 5*
Parapoxvirus Orf/pseudocowpox N/A 1, 5*
Desoxyviridae
Desoxyvirus African swine fever N/A (unless herd established in endemic region) 5
1 5 Zoonotic.
2 5 Replicates in human cells or weak evidence for zoonotic potential.
3 5 May undergo abortive replication and may possibly be oncogenic.
4 5 Belongs to a family with evidence of frequent changes in host range or pathogenicity.
5 5 Undesirable as indicates a breakdown in biosecurity and/or may compromise health of the pigs.
*. Although the virus has not been recorded in pigs, it has been included for reasons such as its wide host range.
N/A5Not applicable, e.g. not reported to occur in pigs, may have been a porcine virus but not recorded in recent history, or geographically restricted.
Table 2 (continued)
Family/genus Species Exclude from herd/cohort Category
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final quarantine barrier) should be carried out in
all members of the cohort of pigs. Tests will
include those for infectious virus, viral antigen,
viral nucleic acid, and/or antibodies. There are
some viral diseases of swine that are not easily
amenable to detection through serologic anti-
body testing, necessitating the use of other
methods; for instance, it is proposed to screen
for porcine cytomegalovirus by polymerase chain
reaction (PCR). At two months and on entry to
the quarantine barrier, sentinel pigs from the
cohort will be euthanized. Histopathologic
examination and virus isolation studies will be
performed on appropriate organs. Any evidence
of viral infection will require implementation of
control measures as outlined above. The doc-
umentation of any virus listed in Table 2 would
require culling of the entire cohort and possibly
all other cohorts, depending on the virus.
Intensive investigation would need to be carried
out of the remaining animals, and the whole
facility would be put on hold.
Awareness of the possibility of detecting
hitherto unknown swine viruses will always be
necessary. The possibility that new pathogens will
be detected from time to time is provided by the
recent identification of a porcine virus related to
the human hepatitis E virus [40,41], and of several
new paramyxoviruses in swine, including the
Menangle and Nipah viruses [42–44]. No doubt
further viruses will be identified, necessitating an
ongoing review of emerging diseases. Each
emergent virus must be the subject of a rigorous
risk assessment that may require review and
modification of biocontainment procedures
together with research into the implications for
xenotransplantation. If the virus is identified as
having significance for xenotransplantation, it
may be necessary to develop serologic and other
tests that allow testing of the pigs to demonstrate
exclusion of the virus.
Endogenous retroviruses
It has been estimated that 0.1 to 1% of the DNA
in the genome of humans and other vertebrates
consists of retroviral genomes (proviruses) that
have been incorporated over millions of years.
The genomes of these endogenous retroviruses
are carried as Mendelian traits in the chromo-
somes, which distinguishes them from exogenous
viruses acquired by infection. Many proviral
elements in mammalian cells are defective, but
pigs carry a group, known as porcine endogenous
retroviruses (PoERVs or PERVs), that often
become transcriptionally active in vitro to
produce virions capable of infecting cells of
many species. PoERVs are members of the
Gammaretrovirus (C type retrovirus) family
[45–50]. These viruses were first described in the
1970s. At that time, they were not shown to be
capable of infecting human cells, but more recent
studies have shown that certain PoERVs will
infect human cells, albeit with low efficiency
[13–15,51].
PoERVs are closely related to the gibbon ape,
feline and murine leukemia viruses, which are the
paradigm members of the Gammaretrovirus
group. Three subgroups have been identified,
PoERV-A, B and C .(Fig. 1), which, by definition,
use different receptors to infect cells [51]. The
complete nucleotide sequence of one subgroup of
virions released from PK15 cells has been obtained
[52], as has another from a proviral clone derived
from miniature swine [53]. These sequences
represent PoERV-B1 and PoERV-C, respectively.
These two viruses share 90.1% identity within gag
PoERV-B
PoERV-B1
0.1
PoERV-A1
PoERV-A
PoERV-C1
PoERV-C
PERV-MSL
Tsukuba
Fig. 1. Unrooted phylogenetic tree of the porcine endogen-
ous retrovirus (PoERV) env sequences identified to date.
Sequences corresponding to PoERV A, B and C have been
shown to form subgroups by interference analysis; formal
subgroup analysis of PoERvs. A1, B1 and C1 has not been
conducted and their designation is provisional. Prototyope
PoERV A and B were obtained from PK15 cells and human
cells infected with PK15virus. Virus strains, known as MSL
and Tsukuba, form prototypeType C isolates. Marker (0.1)
indicates 10% divergence.
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and 96.8% identity within pol, but have distinct
envelope (env) genes. Pseudotype analysis has
shown that both PoERV-A and B can infect
human cells, but with an efficiency about 102 to 103
lower than that of the amphotropic murine
leukemia virus [15,54].
Only one human cell line (HT-1080-1) has been
shown to be susceptible to PoERV-C [51], and it
is not yet clear whether this reflects a general
capacity of this subgroup to infect human cells.
The porcine genome appears to carry approxi-
mately 10 to 20 copies of both PoERV-A and
PoERV-B. Detailed analysis has only been
carried out on relatively few pigs, but it would
appear that around 6 to 10 of the loci are
common to many pigs [14]. PoERV-C has a more
polymorphic pattern; some pigs appear to lack
the virus completely, whereas certain miniature
swine have many copies (c. 50) [15].
Both the transmission of exogenous Gamma-
retroviruses and disease induction generally
require active replication accompanied by a
persistent plasma viremia and shedding of virus
in bodily fluids [55]. In contrast to lentivirus
infections, such as those caused by human or
feline immunodeficiency viruses, full recovery
from Gammaretrovirus infections, such as feline
leukemia virus, is not uncommon in non-
immunocompromised animals. The balance
between a life-long persistent infection and
recovery is almost certainly influenced by the
host’s cell-mediated response, but it is accom-
panied by the production of antiviral antibody,
including neutralizing antibody [56]. With regard
to the development of organ-source pigs for
humans, although more is becoming known
about PoERV variants and their ability to
infect cells in vitro, PoERVs present a particu-
larly difficult problem. Little is known about their
potential to infect human cells in vivo and their
capacity to cause disease in immunocompetent
subjects, let alone in those who are iatrogenically
immunocompromised.
As with other viral infections, there is greater
concern that a xenograft recipient could transmit
the virus through transfer of bodily fluid to an
intimate contact. Transmission would be favored
if the latent period before disease development is
long, as is typical for Gammaretroviruses.
Xenotransplantation could provide the milieu
for selection of variants that may infect the
human population efficiently. Genetic variation
within retroviruses is favored by the lack of
fidelity of reverse transcriptase. Moreover, there
is the potential for recombination between the
porcine retrovirus and endogenous retroviral
elements within the human genome [57]. The
potential risk of PoERV can therefore be
evaluated at several levels. Will virus be produced
from the cells of the xenografted organ? Will the
human recipient’s cells be productively infected,
leading to viremia? Will infectious virus be shed
into the patients’ bodily fluids, posing a public
health hazard?
Transcription of PoERV proviruses appears to
occur in many tissues in vivo, and there is recent
evidence of a low-level viremia in some pigs (G.
Langford et al., submitted), suggesting that
production of virus particles may be expected
in some patients. Some porcine cell types,
including hepatocytes, do not readily express
PoERVs, although others, such as blood mono-
nuclear cells and endothelial cells, may be more
readily induced to express virions in vitro [54,56].
The normal lytic complement barrier to
PoERVs may not operate in patients in which
the transplanted pig organ is transgenic for one or
more human complement regulators (e.g. decay
accelerating factor), so attention must be paid to
the possibility that the patient’s cells will become
infected. PoERVs appear to have envelope
glycoproteins with a low affinity for receptors
on human cells [15,51]. Furthermore, infection of
human cells in vitro often results in a silent
infection in which the provirus is not transcribed.
In immunocompetent hosts, these features would
probably lead to a failure of the virus to establish
a persistent, productive infection. However, the
unknown factor in xenotransplantation is the
influence of iatrogenic immunosuppression,
which may limit the ability of the host’s
immune response to control the infection.
The risk assessment strategy to be adopted
comprises three main areas of focus: (i) determi-
nation of the expression pattern of PoERVs in
pigs used in xenotransplantation, (ii) the evalu-
ation of primate models for evidence of PoERV
infection following the transplantation of porcine
organs or cells, and (iii) a retrospective analysis of
human patients who have been exposed to viable
pig tissues (e.g. ex vivo perfusion of pig livers, pig
skin grafts in the treatment of burns, pig
pancreatic islet transplants, etc.) [58–60]. It
should be emphasized, however, that the latter
two approaches suffer from some limitations.
First, the susceptibility of non-human primates to
PoERV infection may differ from that of
humans. Secondly, most humans who have
been exposed to viable pig tissues to date have
not been severely immunocompromised, and
exposure to these tissues has in many cases
been relatively short. However, detailed studies
on the PoERV status of persons transiently
exposed to living porcine tissues have recently
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been published [58–60], and have been encoura-
ging in being unable to identify any definite
transmission of PoERVs to the recipients. In view
of these findings, limited, carefully controlled
trials of pig organ transplantation may be the
only means of confirming whether there is a
quantifiable risk of PoERV infection from
xenotransplantation. We would suggest that the
unequivocal detection of the PoERV genome in
non-human primate or human cells, or the
detection of a plasma viremia, would be cause
to pause and review the development of a clinical
trial of xenotransplantation using pig organs.
Prion disease
Prion diseases, sometimes known as transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies (TSE), are charac-
terized by the deposition of abnormal proteinase-
resistant prion protein (which is an isoform of
cellular prion protein) in the brain of animals.
The only known difference between the two
conformationally distinct forms of prion protein
is a relative resistance of the former form to
treatment with proteinase K, and this is used as a
basis for diagnosis of prion diseases.
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD), the proto-
type human prion disease, occurs in three forms,
namely (i) sporadic, which is of unknown etiology
and occurs worldwide at a frequency of about 1 in
1 million, (ii) genetic, which is linked to a
mutation in the prion protein gene, and (iii)
infectious, of which two types have been
described for humans, namely Kuru, transmitted
by ritual cannibalism, and iatrogenic CJD. This
latter type has been caused, for example, by the
administration of cadaveric human pituitary-
derived hormones, such as growth hormone, or
by the use of contaminated grafts of cadaveric
human dura mater or cornea. In addition,
accumulating scientific evidence indicates that a
new variant CJD is caused by oral infection with
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)
through dietary exposure [61–63].
Susceptibility of pigs to CJD has been exam-
ined by the intracerebral inoculation of brain
tissue from patients with Kuru; no histopatholo-
gic evidence of transmission of the disease to the
pigs was observed after 5 to 6 years [64]. Pigs
have been fed BSE-contaminated meat and bone
meal, but no case of prion disease has been
reported. Moreover, the experimental adminis-
tration of BSE-infected cattle brain by the oral
route has not led to the development of the
disease in pigs after follow-up periods of over
6 years, whereas sheep and goats, similarly
treated, have developed the disease after mini-
mum incubation periods of 18 and 31 months,
respectively. Only when an intracerebral inocula-
tion of BSE-infected cattle brain was adminis-
tered to pigs, combined with intravenous and
intraperitoneal inoculation, has disease been
documented [65–67]. (The intracerebral inocula-
tion of such tissues is considered to be 100 000
times more effective in causing prion disease in
mice than is the oral route.)
Although scrapie in sheep, the prototype
animal prion disease, and BSE in cattle occur
only through infection [68], it is possible that very
rare unexplained ‘‘sporadic’’ cases of transmis-
sible spongiform encephalopathy could occur in
any mammalian species, including pigs. However,
the breeding and maintenance of prion-free pigs
should be possible if strict measures regarding the
nature of feed stuffs (with no ruminant-derived
products except lactose) and isolation from
contact with other animals are enforced.
The risk of prion disease associated with the
xenotransplantation of pig organs can therefore be
considered to be extremely remote. Moreover,
even if transmission of prion disease to a transplant
recipient occurred, this should not pose a public
health hazard. Nevertheless, monitoring of the
pigs at intervals should include (i) a search for
proteinase-resistant prion protein in the lymph
nodes and brain of sentinel animals (by tests such
as Western blot and ELISA), and (ii) histologic
examination of the brain of sentinel animals for
histopathologic changes of prion disease.
Discussion
The ability to utilize pig organs in humans would
not only resolve the current crisis relating to the
shortage of human cadaveric organs for purposes
of transplantation but would also negate the high
financial and emotional costs associated with the
need for patients to wait long periods, often in an
intensive care unit, until a donor organ becomes
available. Although attention is currently being
directed towards the risk of transfer of a xenozoo-
nosis, this should not distract from the advantages
of the use of pig organs (if scientifically feasible)
which, for example, would obviate the risk of
transfer of an infectious agent with a human
organ [30–33]. The transfer of human cytomega-
lovirus and Epstein–Barr virus is common and is a
major cause of morbidity and mortality in the
post-transplant period. Cytomegalovirus may
result not only in infection but also in an increased
incidence of acute, and possibly chronic, allograft
rejection [69]. Epstein–Barr virus from the donor
may play a role in the development of post-
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transplant lymphoproliferative disease [70,71].
The transfer of many other human microorgan-
isms, including bacteria (e.g. Mycobacterium
tuberculosis, Pseudomonas aeruginosa), parasites
(e.g. Toxoplasma, Strongyloides), and viruses
(e.g. hepatitis B and C, human immunodeficiency
viruses), have all been documented in recipients of
allografts, and are a significant cause of post-
transplant morbidity and mortality [30–33,72].
The rearing and monitoring of pigs under the
conditions outlined in this paper would enable
organ transplantation to be performed using
donor organs with a minimized microbiologic
burden and, furthermore, would also be likely to
reduce the probability of transmission of porcine
agents yet to be identified. With the exception of
PoERVs, it should be possible to provide organs
free of all known agents of potential pathogeni-
city in humans or swine. However, the expense
and effort to do so will be considerable,
particularly as some agents cross the placenta
and others can be readily re-introduced into
breeding herds. The major remaining risks would
appear to be those related to the presence of
unknown viruses and/or PoERVs. Hitherto
unknown viruses may possibly remain undetected
until they cause symptoms and signs of infection
in the organ recipient. There should be continu-
ing efforts to identify new infectious agents that
may infect normal and/or transgenic pigs using
state-of-the-art technologies [73]. Experiments
are in progress involving intense microbiologic
monitoring of pigs receiving pharmacologic
immunosuppression and may lead to identifica-
tion of viruses not isolated from non-immuno-
suppressed pigs.
Three PoERV subgroups have to date been
documented. As some of these may be present in
a high copy number and low zygosity, selective
breeding or genetic technology to eliminate these
proviruses may be difficult, if not impossible. The
alternative, for xenotransplantation might be to
accept their presence, and establish whether or
not they are pathogenic, or might give rise to
pathogenic agents, in humans. If PoERVs are
found not to result in clinical problems, such as
cancer or an immunodeficiency state, in the organ
recipient for many years, possibly decades, then
the benefit of an organ transplant to that
individual patient may well outweigh the risks
of such infection. The acceptability of xenotrans-
plantation may then depend on an assessment of
whether such retrovirus-infected patients pose a
risk to their human contacts, such as family,
friends and healthcare professionals. However, it
should be realized that, if infection from human-
to-human contact occurs initially only at a low
frequency, which is not unlikely, this assessment
may prove extremely difficult.
Recipients of pig xenografts will need to be
intensively monitored for PoERV infection by
PCR for latent infection in blood mononuclear
cells, reverse transcriptase-PCR for viral nucleic
acids, product-enhanced reverse transcriptase
assay to detect plasma viraemia, and serology
for the detection of retroviral-specific antibody.
Pre-operative patient counseling regarding the
possibility of retroviral infection, and implica-
tions for the individual and his/her intimate
contacts, will be important. The development of
anti-viral strategies, such as vaccination, passive
immunotherapy, and anti-viral agents, should be
investigated. Before clinical trials are initiated,
contingency plans should be developed in the
event that a patient is found to be infected with
PoERV so that the risk to the health of the public
is minimized.
As with most medical advances, no matter how
rigorous the pre-clinical testing, it may be
impossible to exclude all risk, even if this is
related only to hitherto unknown pig viruses and
microorganisms. The ultimate decision on
whether to employ any new therapeutic agent
or procedure rests on an assessment of the risk-
benefit ratio. In the case of xenotransplantation,
this may possibly require weighing the potential
risk of the emergence of a new human pathogen
against the benefit of an unlimited supply of
organs and tissues for patients with end-stage
organ failure.
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